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From a theoretical point of view, modern political economy has developed by 
depriving economic interactions of their social content. A typical example of this 
trend is given by the economy’s working framework implied by Walrasian general 
equilibrium models. In this context, market interactions are reduced to the 
transmission of coded information through the auctioneer’s agency. Agents never 
meet: they simply pass on to the auctioneer their purchase and selling proposals (Gui 
2002). However, the economic activity is deeply embedded in the social structure, 
and agents’ decisions are always influenced by a wide range of social and cultural 
factors. For example, most case studies show that enterprises devote an ever more 
relevant part of their financial resources to activities which are not directly related to 
production processes. Nurturing a cooperative climate inside the workforce and 
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building trustworthy relationships with external partners generally constitute a key 
task for management. On the other side, workers’ satisfaction is ever more affected 
by the quality of human relationships among colleagues, and not only by traditional 
factors like wage and job’s conditions. According to Gui (2000), such relational 
assets contribute to firms’ economic performance just like new machinery and 
warehouses. Growing attention has thus been devoted to the role that social norms, 
the diffusion of trust and logics of reciprocity play in shaping different kinds of 
transactions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991; Berg, Dickaut 
and McCabe 1995; Fehr, Gatcher and Kirchsteiger 1997; Frey 1997; Fehr and 
Gatcher 2000; Sugden 2000). The growth literature is now pervaded by studies 
addressing the relationship between the economy’s social and institutional fabric, the 
economic performance and development patterns (Kormendi and Meguire 1985; 
Bénabou 1996; Barro 1996; Collier and Gunning 1997; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Temple and Johnson 1998; Whiteley 2000; Zak and Knack 2001; Gradstein and 
Justman 2002). Such voluminous strands of the literature may be interpreted as the 
sign of the emerging need to fill the gap that, in economics, still separates society 
from the economy.  
 
The economic and sociological literature on social capital is another symptom of such 
need. In 1993, Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti tried to explain the different 
institutional and economic performance of the Italian regions as the result of the 
influence exerted by some aspects of the social structure, summarized into the 
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multidimensional concept of ‘social capital’. This study has received wide criticism 
in the social science debates of the 1990s. However, it posed a milestone for social 
capital theory, which registered an explosive development in the following decade, 
rapidly involving the attention of economists. As pointed out by Isham, Kelly and 
Ramaswamy (2002), a ‘keyword’ search in all journals in EconLit, the most 
frequently used database of references in economics, shows that citations for ‘social 
capital’ have grown rapidly over the last decade, doubling each year since the late 
1990s. In 2000, social capital had about a quarter of the absolute number of citations. 
The so-called ‘Italian work’ (Putnam et al 1993) has been pronounced by the editor 
of the mainstream Quarterly Journal of Economics as the most cited contribution 
across the social sciences in the 1990s (Fine 2001; 83).  
 
During the last ten years, the concept of social capital has been invoked almost in 
every field of social science research, and has been used to explain an immense range 
of phenomena, from political participation to the institutional performance, from 
health to corruption, from the efficiency of public services to the economic success of 
countries. However, despite the immense amount of research on it, social capital’s 
definition remains elusive and, also due to the chronic lack of suitable data, there is 
neither a universal measurement method, nor a single underlying indicator commonly 
accepted by the literature. From a historical perspective, one could argue that social 
capital is not a concept but a praxis, a code word used to federate disparate but 
interrelated research interests and to facilitate the cross-fertilization of ideas across 
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disciplinary boundaries (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). As pointed out by Brown and 
Ashman (1996), one of the primary benefits of the idea of social capital is that it is 
allowing scholars, policy makers and practitioners from different disciplines to enjoy 
an unprecedented level of cooperation and dialogue.  
Even if conceptual vagueness may have promoted the use of the term among social 
sciences, it also has been an impediment to both theoretical and empirical research of 
phenomena in which social capital may play a role. This chapter provides an 
introduction to the concept of social capital, and carries out a critical review of the 
empirical literature on social capital and economic development. The survey points 
out six main weaknesses affecting the empirics of social capital. Identified 
weaknesses are then used to analyze, in a critical perspective, some prominent 
empirical studies and new interesting research published in last two years. The review 
particularly lingers over the ‘Italian work’ carried out by Putnam et al (1993), for two 
main reasons. Firstly, this research constitutes the seminal study of this voluminous 
strand of the literature. Secondly, its shortcomings are ‘critical’, in that they 
repeatedly present themselves again in most of the following studies in the field.  
 
The outline of this chapter is as follows: section 2 briefly introduces the concept of 
social capital, and its relevance to economics. Section 3 presents a critical perspective 
on the empirics of social capital, pointing out the main weaknesses of existing 
measurement methods. Section 4 reviews the empirical literature on social capital and 
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economic development. The chapter is closed by some concluding remarks and 
guidelines for further researches.  
 
What is social capital and why is it relevant to economics? 
 
Although it has been popularized only in the last decade, due to Bourdieu’s (1980; 
1986), Coleman’s (1988; 1990) and Putnam’s (1993; 1995a) prominent studies, the 
concept of social capital has a long intellectual history in social sciences. The sense in 
which the term is used today dates back to about 90 years, when Hanifan (1916) 
invoked the concept of social capital to explain the importance of community 
participation in enhancing school performance. After Hanifan's work, the idea of 
social capital disappeared from the social sciences debate (Seely, Sim and Loosely 
1956; Homans 1961; Loury 1977; Jacobs 1971). Three decades before Putnam's 
work, Edward Banfield (1958) used social capital concept to explain southern Italy’s 
economic backwardness, but his study did not arouse interest in economic debates. 
Bourdieu (1980) identifies three dimensions of capital each with its own relationship 
to the concept of class: economic, cultural and social capital. Bourdieu’s idea of 
social capital puts the emphasis on class conflicts: social relations are used to increase 
the ability of an actor to advance his interests, and becomes a resource in social 
struggles: social capital is ‘the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to 
an individual or group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu and 
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Wacquant 1986; 119, expanded from Bourdieu 1980; 2). Social capital thus has two 
components: it is, first, a resource that is connected with group membership and 
social networks. ‘The volume of social capital possessed by a given agent ... depends 
on the size of the network of connections that he can effectively mobilize’ (Bourdieu 
1986: 249). Secondly, it is a quality produced by the totality of the relationships 
between actors, rather than merely a common ‘quality’ of the group (Bourdieu 1980). 
At the end of the 1980s, Coleman gave new relevance to Bourdieu’s concept of social 
capital. According to Coleman, ‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is not a 
single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: they all 
consist in some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors 
within the structure’ (Coleman 1988: 98). In the early 90s, the concept of social 
capital finally became a central topic in the social sciences debate.  
 
In 1993, Putnam et al published their famous research on local government in Italy, 
which concluded that the performance of social and political institutions is powerfully 
influenced by citizen engagement in community affairs, or what, following Coleman, 
the authors termed ‘social capital’. In this context, social capital is referred to as 
‘features of social life-networks, norms, and trust, that enable participants to act 
together more effectively to pursue shared objectives’ (Putnam 1995b). Like other 
forms of capital, social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of 
certain ends, that in its absence would not be possible. But, in Coleman’s words, 
‘Unlike other forms of capital, social capital inheres in the structure of relations 
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between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in 
physical implements of production’ (Coleman 1988: 98). The use of the term ‘capital’ 
is criticized by several authors belonging to the field of economics, in that it refers to 
things that can be owned. For example, Bowles and Gintis (2002) sustain that the 
term ‘community’ would be more appropriate, because it ‘better captures the aspects 
of good governance that explain social capital’s popularity, as it focuses attention on 
what groups do rather than what people own’ (Bowles and Gintis 2002: 422). By 
‘community’ the authors mean a group who interact directly, frequently and in multi-
faceted ways. This point is stressed by Arrow (1999), who sustains that ‘capital’ is 
something ‘alienable’, that is, its ownership can be transferred to one person to 
another. According to Arrow,  it is difficult – as with human capital – to change the 
ownership of social capital. 
 
The cited perspectives on social capital are markedly different in origins and fields of 
application, but they all agree on the ability of certain aspects of the social structure 
to generate positive externalities for members of a group, who gain a competitive 
advantage in pursuing their ends.  
 
From a rational choice theory perspective, it is possible to describe social capital as 
an input of agents’ utility and production functions. Becker (1974; 1996) describes 
social capital as a particular kind of intermediate good for the production of assets 
(the so-called ‘commodities’, corresponding to people’s basic needs) entering as 
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arguments in agents’ utility functions. According to Becker, people invest rationally 
in social capital in the context of an utility maximization problem. Becker’s social 
capital is thus an individual resource, used within the context of utility maximization 
problems by perfectly rational and informed agents. The role of social capital as a 
collective resource serving the achievement of macro outcomes is instead well 
explained by the new economic sociology perspective (Granovetter 1973; 1985). 
Granovetter identifies social capital mainly with social networks of weak bridging 
ties. According to the author, ‘Whatever is to be diffused can reach a larger number 
of people, and traverse greater social distance, when passed through weak ties rather 
than strong. If one tells a rumour to all his close friends, and they do likewise, many 
will hear the rumour a second and third time, since those linked by strong ties tend to 
share friends’ (Granovetter 1973: 1366). Social networks can thus be considered as a 
powerful mean to foster the diffusion of information and knowledge, lowing 
uncertainty and transaction costs.  
 
The problem of measuring social capital: a critical perspective 
 
Despite the immense amount of research on it, the definition of social capital has 
remained elusive. Conceptual vagueness, the coexistence of multiple definitions, the 
chronic lack of suitable data have so far been an impediment to both theoretical and 
empirical research of phenomena in which social capital may play a role. In this 
regard it is possible to observe that the problems suffered by empirical studies of 
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social capital are, at some level, endemic to all empirical work in economics 
(Durlauf, 2002). Heckmann (2000) states that the establishment of causal 
relationships is intrinsically difficult: ‘Some of the disagreement that arises in 
interpreting a given body of data is intrinsic to the field of economics because of the 
conditional nature of causal knowledge. The information in any body of data is 
usually too weak to eliminate competing causal explanations of the same 
phenomenon. There is no mechanical algorithm for producing a set of ‘assumption 
free’ facts or causal estimates based on those facts’ (Heckman 2000: 91).  
 
However, according to Durlauf (2002) ‘The empirical social capital literature seems 
to be particularly plagued by vague definition of concepts, poorly measured data, 
absence of appropriate exchangeability conditions, and lack of information necessary 
to make identification claims plausible’ (Durlauf 2002: 22). In his article, the author 
reviews three famous empirical studies 1 , concluding that they do not help in 
understanding the socioeconomic outcomes of social capital. Durlauf's critique is one 
step forward in respect to the position of some prominent economists, who doubt the 
possibility of providing credible measures, and question the opportunity itself to 
consider the concept as a useful analytical tool for economics. In his critique to 
Fukuyama, Solow (1995) writes: ‘If ‘social capital’ is to be more than a buzzword, 
                                                 
1 Durlauf's benchmark studies are Furstenberg and Hughes (1995), Narayan and Pritchett (1999), 
Knack and Keefer (1997).  
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something more than mere relevance or even importance is required. ... The stock of 
social capital should somehow be measurable, even inexactly’ (1995: 36).  
 
As a reply, it is possible to observe that, during last ten years, empirical research has 
proposed a great variety of methods for measuring social capital and testing its ability 
to produce relevant social, economic, and political outcomes. However, the empirics 
of social capital still suffer from a definite difficulty to address macro outcomes in a 
convincing way, and this strand of the literature seems to be chronically affected by 
some definite problems. In particular, we can identify six main shortcomings: 
  
1. despite the great amount of research on it, the definition of social capital 
remains substantially elusive. Following Coleman (1988), great part of the 
literature refers to social capital as all ‘the aspects of the social structure that 
facilitate certain actions of actors within the structure … Making possible the 
achievement of certain ends that, in its absence, would not be possible’ 
(Coleman 1988: 98). Such ‘productive’ aspects of the social structure can vary 
according to different environmental situations and agents’ needs: ‘A given 
form of social capital that is valuable in facilitating certain actions may be 
useless or even harmful for others’ (ibidem). According to this approach, it 
seems virtually impossible to provide a single, universal, definition of what 
social capital is, and a unique, underlying, method of measurement to be used 
within the empirical research. 
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 2. The idea that social capital is a multidimensional concept is now commonly 
accepted in the debate. This allows each author to focus on a particular aspect 
of the concept, according to the aims and scope of his own study. Empirical 
work tends to address different dimensions of social capital, therefore 
adopting particular measures, derived from diverse data sources. This makes 
any general assessment difficult, due to incomparability in sampling designs 
and question wording (Wuthnow 2002). Furthermore, researchers cannot 
account for measurement error, which we would expect to find in the survey 
questions used to assess social capital (Paxton 1999). 
 
3. Most empirical studies measure social capital through ‘indirect’ indicators, 
not representing the social capital’s key components already identified by the 
theoretical literature (commonly social networks, trust and social norms). 
Such indicators – for example, crime rates, teenage pregnancy, blood 
donation, participation rates in tertiary education – are quite popular in the 
empirical research, but their use has led to considerable confusion about what 
social capital is, as distinct from its outcomes, and what the relationship 
between social capital and its outcomes may be. Research reliant upon an 
outcome of social capital as an indicator of it will necessarily find social 
capital to be related to that outcome. Social capital becomes tautologically 
present whenever an outcome is observed (Portes 1998; Durlauf 1999). Of 
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course, from a lexical point of view, it is possible to attribute the ‘social 
capital’ label to every aspect of the economy’s social fabric providing a 
favourable environment for production and well-being. However, such 
definition poses a ‘logic’ problem: if social capital is everything that can make 
agents cooperate or markets work better, then any empirical analysis will find 
that social capital causes cooperation among agents and improves the 
efficiency of markets. This approach simply ‘sterilizes’ the social capital 
literature, making it unable to foster the explanatory power of economic 
studies addressing the socio-cultural factors of growth.  
 
4. A great part of existing cross-national studies on the economic outcomes of 
social capital is based on measures of trust drew from the World Values 
Survey (WVS)2. The WVS’ way to measure generalized trust is the famous 
question developed by Rosenberg (1956): ‘Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you can be too careful in dealing with 
people?’. Possible responses to this question are: ‘Most people can be trusted’, 
‘Can’t be too careful’, or ‘Don’t know’. The trust indicator resulting from this 
question is given by the percentage of respondents replying ‘most people can 
be trusted’, often after deleting the ‘don’t know’ responses. Trust measured 
through surveys is a ‘micro’ and ‘cognitive’ concept, in that it represents the 
                                                 
2 See for example Knack and Keefer (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
Zak and Knack (2001), Uslaner (2002), Beugelsdijk and van Schaik (2001), Bjørnskov (2003). 
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individuals’ perception of their social environment, related to the particular 
position that interviewed people occupy in the social structure. The 
aggregation of such data, however, creates a measure of what can be called 
‘macro’ or ‘social’ trust which looses its linkage with the social and historical 
circumstances in which trust and social capital are located. As pointed out by 
Foley and Edwards (1999), empirical studies based on cross-country 
comparisons of trust may be a cul de sac, because of their inability to address 
macro outcomes, in view of the absence of the broader context within which 
attitudes are created and determined. Fine (2001) argues that ‘if social capital 
is context-dependent – and context is highly variable by how, when and 
whom, then any conclusion are themselves illegitimate as the basis for 
generalisation to other circumstances’ (Fine 2001: 105).  
 
Also studies focusing on social networks instead of social trust generally do 
not take into the appropriate account the multidimensional, context-dependent 
and dynamic nature of social capital. They usually analyze just one kind of 
network (for example voluntary organizations), which is considered as 
representative of the social capital concept as a whole, through a single 
measure. However, a simple descriptive analysis of available data allows us to 
point out that, even if they constitute just one aspect of the multifaceted 
concept of social capital, social networks are themselves a multidimensional 
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phenomenon. They are characterized by different aspects, which can be 
described by a composite set of multiple indicators.  
 
5. Following Putnam’s hints, most studies focus on voluntary organizations as a 
proxy for measuring social capital. The claim is that in areas with stronger, 
dense, horizontal, and more cross-cutting networks, there is a spillover from 
membership in organizations to the cooperative values and norms that citizens 
develop. In areas where networks with such characteristics do not develop, 
there are fewer opportunities to learn civic virtues and democratic attitudes, 
resulting in a lack of trust.  However, there are several reasons to doubt the 
efficacy of social capital measures simply based on the density of voluntary 
organizations. Firstly, even though individuals who join groups and who 
interact with others regularly show attitudinal and behavioural differences 
compared to non-joiners, the possibility exists that people self-select into 
association groups, depending on their original levels of generalized trust and 
reciprocity. Secondly, the group experiences might be more pronounced in 
their impact when members are diverse and from different backgrounds.  
According to some authors, if diversity matters for socialization of 
cooperative values, then voluntary associations might not be the measure to 
take into account, as such groups have been found relatively homogeneous in 
character. Voluntary associations indeed generally recruit members who have 
already relatively high civic attitudes (Popielarz 1999; Mutz 2002; Uslaner 
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2002).  Moreover, in general, until now the literature has not provided a micro 
theory explaining trust’s transmission mechanism from groups to the entire 
society, and the logic underlying the connection between social ties and 
generalized trust has never been clearly developed (Rosenblum 1998: Uslaner 
2002). Thus, every finding on the correlation and/or the causal nexus 
connecting membership in civic associations to supposed social capital’s 
economic outcomes must be handled with extreme caution.  
 
The empirical literature on social capital and economic development: a critical 
review 
 
After the publication of Making Democracy Work by Putnam et al in 1993, economic 
research has produced a large volume of studies investigating the relationship 
between different aspects of the multidimensional concept of social capital and 
economic growth, usually represented by per capita income. For the purposes of this 
chapter, such an impressive amount of empirical studies can be partitioned into two 
main categories. 
 
a. Studies finding a positive relationship between social capital and economic 
development, but suffering from questionable methods for the measurement 
of social capital, as described in the five points listed in the previous section. 
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b. Studies that, independently from the adopted measurement method, do not 
find a positive relationship between social capital and economic development, 
and some alternative, interesting, views. 
 
Putnam and his disciples: the empirical literature on the positive relationship 
between social capital and economic development 
 
The seminal study of this voluminous strand of the literature is the already cited 
‘Italian work’ carried out by Putnam et al (1993). In that research, social capital is 
measured by means of four main indicators of: 
 
1. the number of voluntary organizations, including, for example, sport clubs and 
cultural circles. 
2. The number of local newspaper readers. The idea for using this indicator is 
that newspapers, in Italy, constitute the most effective means to get 
information on local communities’ problems and events. People reading 
newspapers are thus better informed and more likely to get involved in 
community’s life.  
3. Voter turn-out at referenda. Since voting for a referendum does not imply 
immediate and direct advantages, such a behaviour cannot be founded on the 
pursuit of personal aims. Therefore it has to be considered as a signal of civic 
spirit or what, following Putnam, we can term ‘civicness’. 
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4. The relevance of preference votes expressed by voters within political 
elections. This is interpreted as an indicator of civic backwardness, since, in 
the Italian political system, ‘preference votes’ have been historically used as a 
mean for establishing client relationships and to obtain patronage favours. 
 
The authors find a positive and significant correlation between these indicators and 
local institutions’ performance. Moreover, citizen-initiated contacts with government 
officials in the south tend to involve issues of narrowly personal concerns, while 
contacts in the more trusting regions tend to involve larger issues with positive 
implications for the welfare of the region as a whole. In a subsequent study, Heliwell 
and Putnam (1995) show that social capital, as measured through the same indicators, 
also positively affects the economic performance and, in the long run, the process of 
economic growth in the Italian regions.  In the light of the arguments proposed 
previously in this chapter, it is possible to identify three main shortcomings in the 
‘Italian work’.  
 
1. The study relies on ‘indirect’ indicators as social capital measures. The 
number of newspaper readers, voter turnout at referenda and preference votes 
are not directly related to social capital’s key components, which Putnam 
himself identifies with ‘Features of social life-networks, norms, and trust, that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared 
objectives’ (Putnam 1994: 1). As pointed out previously, this may lead to 
171 
considerable confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from its 
outcomes, and what the relationship between social capital and its outcomes 
may be. Research reliant upon an outcome of social capital as an indicator of 
it will necessarily find social capital to be related to that outcome. In this case, 
social capital - although previously defined by the authors as the complex set 
of trust and social networks - becomes tautologically present whenever an 
outcome, like newspaper diffusion and high voter turnout, is observed. The 
existence of such relationship is not proved, and neither analyzed, within the 
study. 
 
2. The remaining indicator adopted by Putnam et al (2003) is a measure of the 
density of that particular type of social network shaped by voluntary 
organizations. Some problems related to this measure have been briefly 
described above. In particular, even admitting the possibility for associations 
to exert a positive influence on trust and development, we have to state that, 
until now, theoretical studies have not provided an explanation of the 
mechanism through which trust within groups generalizes to the entire 
society. Moreover, as already argued, an exploratory analysis of available data 
allows us to point out that, even if they constitute just one aspect of the 
multifaceted concept of social capital, social networks are themselves a 
multidimensional phenomenon. Recent studies carried out on the Italian case 
(Piselli 2001; Andreotti and Barbieri 2003; Nuzzo and Micucci 2003; Sabatini 
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2005b) show that social networks and, within social networks, voluntary 
organizations, are both characterized by different aspects, which can be 
described only by a composite set of multiple indicators, or by latent 
indicators synthesizing the different dimensions.  
 
3. According to the measurements carried out by Putnam et al (1993), the areas 
of Italy with the best institutional performance were those with left-wing local 
governments. This variable could be considered able to provide better 
explanations for institutional performance. This poses the problem of the role 
of omitted variables in the Italian work and, more in general, in all empirical 
studies of social capital. Moreover, social capital may be endogenous to 
institutional and economic performance, rather than a cause of them. A 
serious attempt to overcome these shortcomings could be made through the 
use of structural equations models (SEMs) as a mean to carry out reliable 
empirical investigations accounting also for omitted variables (Sabatini 2006). 
SEMs allow the taking into account of the joint effect of unknown exogenous 
phenomena on variables explicitly considered in the model. In addition, this 
technique provides a better evaluation of the form and direction of the causal 
relationship linking social capital to its supposed outcomes, making it possible 




I consider these points ‘critical’ because they repeatedly present themselves again in 
most of the following literature in the field. Knack and Keefer (1997) and La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) use data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) to conduct cross-country tests of Putnam’s hypotheses. These surveys include 
roughly 1000 respondents in each of several dozen countries, and are intended to be 
nationally representative. Trust values for each country are calculated as the 
percentage of respondents who agree that ‘most people can be trusted’ rather than the 
alternative that ‘you can't be too careful in dealing with people’. Knack and Keefer 
(1997) find that trust and civic norms are unrelated to horizontal networks and have a 
strong impact on economic performance in a sample of 29 market economies, 
suggesting that, if declining social capital in the United States has adverse 
implications for growth, it is the erosion of trust and civic cooperation, as 
documented by Knack (1992), that are of greater concern than the decline in 
associational life emphasized by Putnam (1995a; 1995b). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) test the relationship between trust, income and firms’ 
scale, regressing the revenues of the 20 largest firms as a proportion of GDP on per 
capita income, trust in people, and a measure of trust in family members. The authors 
find that the scale measure is unrelated to income, and strongly related to the two 
trust measures: positively for trust in people, and negatively for trust in family. These 
results are coherent with the early thesis of Banfield (1958) and, in particular, with 
the intuition of Fukuyama (1995), who stressed the relationship between social 
capital and industrial organizations. All these works have provided relevant hints to 
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social capital research, but they all suffer from their way of measuring social trust at 
the national level. As already stressed, trust measured by the WVS is a ‘micro’ and 
‘cognitive’ concept, in that it represents the individuals’ perception of their social 
environment, related to the particular position that interviewed people occupy in the 
social structure. The aggregation of such data creates a measure of what can be called 
‘macro’ or ‘social’ trust which loses its linkage with the social and historical 
circumstances in which trust and social capital are located.  
 
More recently, a notable study carried out by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004), 
focusing on the relationship between social capital and another aspect of economic 
prosperity, financial development, has received great attention in the economics 
debate. The authors’ basic idea is that: ‘One of the mechanisms through which social 
capital impacts economic efficiency is by enhancing the prevailing level of trust … 
Since financial contracts are the ultimate trust-intensive contracts, social capital 
should have major effects on the development of financial markets’ (Guiso, Sapienza 
and Zingales 2004: 527). The authors measure social capital through blood donation 
and electoral participation, claiming that both measures ‘are driven only by social 
pressure and internal norms, i.e., the fundamental components of social capital’ 
(Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2004: 528). As already pointed out, this study 
measures social capital through indicators of what could be considered as one of its 
outcomes. The authors claim to have found a positive and significant relationship 
between social capital and financial development, but they rather prove the existence 
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of a positive correlation between financial development, blood donation and electoral 
participation, without providing a credible explanation nor for such a relationship, 
neither for the supposed linkage between social capital and the variables adopted for 
its measurement. 
 
Is social capital necessarily good for economic development? 
 
Besides social capital’s measurement problems, the empirical evidence on the linkage 
between economic prosperity and social capital is sometimes conflicting. Putnam 
(2000) and Costa and Kahn (2003) document the large decline in social capital in the 
United States in the twentieth century. However, it is hard to argue that the U.S. 
economy did not flourish over this same period. On the other hand, the decline itself 
of U.S. social capital has been widely questioned. For example, Paxton (1999) 
analyzes multiple indicators of social capital in the United States over a 20-year 
period. The results do not support Putnam’s claims, showing instead some decline in 
a general measure of social capital, a decline in trust in individuals, but no general 
decline in trust in institutions, and no decline in associations. 
 
The role of associational activity is a subject of greater contention. Putnam attributes 
the economic success and governmental efficiency of northern Italy, relative to the 
south, in large part to its richer associational life, claiming that associations ‘instil in 
their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness’ (Putnam et al 
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1993: 89-90). However, this cooperation and solidarity is invoked most commonly to 
resolve collective action problems at the level of smaller groups. If the economic 
goals of a group conflict with those of other groups or of unorganized interests, the 
overall effect of group memberships and activities on economic performance could be 
negative. Adam Smith noted that when ‘people of the same trade’ meet ‘even for 
merriment and diversion’ the result is often ‘a conspiracy against the public’ or ‘some 
contrivance to raise prices’ 3 . Similarly, Olson (1982) observes that horizontal 
associations can hurt growth because many of them act as special interest groups 
lobbying for preferential policies that impose disproportionate costs on society. 
Putnam’s claims have been widely questioned also by empirical studies on Italy. In a 
recent paper, Peri (2004) provides a measure of social capital as civic involvement, 
given by the first principal component of three variables representing associational 
density, newspaper readers and voter turnout at a particular referendum. The author 
finds a positive correlation of civic involvement with measures of economic 
development in the raw data, but attributes it mostly to North-South differences: the 
correlation in fact does not survive checks of robustness and the inclusion of 
geographic controls. It is noteworthy that Peri’s (2004) measurement of social capital 
follows a conceptual pathway very similar to that already covered by Putnam et al 
(1993), and suffers from the shortcomings described earlier. 
 
                                                 
3 This quotation is taken from Knack and Keefer (1997). 
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Keefer and Knack (1997) provide some evidence for the conflicting influences of 
associational activity on growth, using a variable from Banks and Textor (1963) 
called ‘interest articulation’ which assesses (on a subjective scale ranging from 1 to 4) 
how effectively groups articulate their policy preferences to government. Although 
the ability of groups to articulate their interests is likely to be an important restraint 
on government, it also provides groups a way to capture private benefits at the 
expense of society. Consistent with the view that these two effects tend to counteract 
each other, ‘interest articulation’ proves to be an insignificant predictor of growth 
when introduced into Barro-type cross-country tests. As pointed out in the previous 
section, Knack and Keefer (1997) find that trust and civic norms are unrelated to 
horizontal networks and have a strong impact on economic performance in a sample 
of 29 market economies. 
 
Helliwell (1996) shows that trust, and an index of group memberships, are each 
negatively and significantly related to productivity growth for a sample of 17 OECD 
members. This sample omits the poor and middle-income nations for which trust has 
the largest effects. 
 
The complexity of the relationship between social capital and growth is even more 
evident at the theoretical level. In particular, it is possible to argue that economic 
growth could be itself a factor of social capital’s destruction: if people devote too 
time to work and consumption, therefore sustaining growth, little time remains for 
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social participation. Routledge and von Amsberg (2003) show that the process of 
economic growth is generally accompanied by higher labour turnover, which changes 
the social structure increasing heterogeneity and affecting social capital. The authors 
focus on social capital as the aspect of the social structure influencing cooperative 
behaviour. In larger communities, which grow faster or are more efficient, social 
capital can deteriorate, making cooperative trade generally harder to sustain. By 
contrast, reduced labour mobility, which results in decreased labour efficiency, 
increases welfare by increasing the proportion of trades that are cooperative. In other 
terms, ‘the benefit of the increased social capital can outweigh the cost of lost 
efficiency’ (Routledge and von Amsberg 2003: 172). This result is supported by 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), who show that in heterogeneous communities 
participation in groups that require direct contact among members is low, arguing that 
such a decline destroys social trust, therefore hampering economic growth. This study 
contains an interesting empirical result about substitution between social and private 
activities. The authors show that, controlling for individual and community level 
variables, ‘moving from a full-time to a part-time job increases the propensity to 
participate’ (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000: 880): working more brings about a 
reduction in social participation. Costa and Kahn (2003) show that this process has 
been particularly relevant for women in the last half century, since the enormous 
increase in their labour force participation rate, in the U.S. as well as in other 
advanced societies, has subtracted from them much time previously available for 
social activities. Devoting most time to work and consumption can also be interpreted 
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as a ‘defensive choice’: Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2002) argue that the individual 
utility of social participation depends both on one’s own and on aggregate 
participation, as well as on the opportunities available in the social environment. 
Agents may ‘defend’ themselves from a poor social environment by shifting to 
private activities, less exposed to external effects. The authors show that: ‘If this 
strategy spreads over, private activities will be fostered, but at the expense of social 
activities. Since both effects accumulate over time, the outcome may be a joint 
occurrence of economic growth and social poverty’ (Antoci, Sacco and Vanin 2002: 
23). By contrast, spending more time in social activities can lead to a richer social 
environment, but may act as an obstacle to private growth.  However, the political 
science literature widely shows that social participation can foster the diffusion of 
trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Stolle 1998; Stolle and 
Rochon 1998; Hooghe and Stolle 2003), therefore indirectly supporting economic 
growth. In other terms, it is possible to argue that, if economic growth destroys social 
participation and trust, it can run faster, but is not sustainable in the long run.  
 
All empirical studies reported in former two sections present also a further, critical, 
limit: they do not take into appropriate account the very multidimensionality of the 
concept of social capital. Therefore, ignoring fertile insights provided by the 
sociological literature, the economics research on the empirics of social capital 
generally neglects the necessary distinction between different forms of social capital, 
e.g. ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging social capital’. Studies in this field generally consider 
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just from one to three of social capital’s dimensions for carrying out empirical 
investigations on their effects on a few, definite, outcomes. According to such a 
limited scope of analysis, these studies in turn conclude that social capital is good or 




Social capital is a multidimensional concept. Its most effective definition is that 
provided by Coleman, who stated that ‘Social capital is defined by its function. It is 
not a single entity, but a variety of different entities, with two elements in common: 
they all consist in some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions 
of actors within the structure’ (Coleman 1988: 98). Such a vague definition however 
makes every attempt of empirical analysis difficult and hazardous. The review of 
measurement methods carried out in this paper has pointed out six main weaknesses 
affecting almost all the empirical studies: 
 
1. there is not a single, universal, definition of what social capital is, and a 
unique, underlying, method of measurement to be used within the empirical 
research. 
2. The use of different definitions, diverse indicators from various data sources, 
makes any general assessment difficult, due to incomparability in sampling 
designs and question wording. 
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3. The use of measures of trust drawn from the World Values Survey leads to the 
creation of indicators of ‘social’ trust losing their linkage with the social and 
historical circumstances in which trust and social capital are located.  
4. The use of ‘indirect’ indicators, not representing social capital’s key 
components as identified by the theoretical literature, may be misleading, and 
causes a considerable confusion about what social capital is, as distinct from 
its outcomes, and what the relationship between social capital and its 
outcomes may be. 
5. The difficulty of accounting for the multidimensionality of each of social 
capital’s diverse facets, such as social networks.  
6. The weakness of social capital measures simply based on the density of 
voluntary organizations. 
 
Of course, from a lexical point of view, it is possible to attribute the ‘social capital’ 
label to every aspect of the economy’s social fabric providing a favourable 
environment for production and well-being. Still, such an approach poses a ‘logic’ 
problem: if social capital is everything that can make agents cooperate or markets 
work better, then any empirical analysis will find that social capital causes 
cooperation among agents and improves the efficiency of markets. This approach 
simply ‘sterilizes’ the social capital literature, making it unable to foster the 
explanatory power of economic studies addressing the socio-cultural factors of 
growth. The survey of the literature carried out in this paper points out:  
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(a)  the need to acknowledge the multidimensional nature of social capital. It does 
not make sense taking into consideration just a single dimension, considering 
it as representative of the concept as a whole, and analyzing its effect on 
economic performance. By contrast to what to date has been done by most 
cross-country studies, we have to be very cautious in carrying out 
international comparisons relying just on a single basic indicator (like trust 
levels). Each of social capital’s dimension may exert diverse effects on 
economic variables, in turn fostering or hampering growth and development. 
The need emerges to distinguish at least between ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging 
social capital’. Bonding social capital is shaped by social ties fostering the 
pursuit of narrow - sometimes sectarian and contrasting with community’s 
well-being - interests, and hampering the diffusion of knowledge and 
information. Bridging social capital is composed of weak ties, building 
bridges and connections between different types of networks, therefore 
fostering knowledge diffusion and socioeconomic progress.  
 
(b)  The expediency of focusing just on structural key dimensions of the concept, 
therefore excludes by such measurement the toolbox of all indicators referring 
to social capital’s supposed outcomes. Some recent studies advance the 
possibility to focus on social networks, rather than on measures of perceived 
trust or on hazardous ‘indirect’ indicators. Such a strategy can foster the 
robustness of analysis without causing a relevant loss of generality. In this 
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case, however, we must remember the existence of different types of social 
networks. Some of them do not necessarily play a positive role in the process 
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